EXPLAINER: Can a church be held liable for abuse by someone it didn’t employ?
On 17 November 2026, the Queensland parliament voted down a bill that would have let survivors of institutional child abuse sue the institution — a church, a club, a charity — for abuse by someone it didn’t formally employ. The state’s Labor opposition introduced it; the Crisafulli government defeated it.
The High Court created that problem two years ago, and most people assume the child abuse Royal Commission had already settled it. It didn't. Whether a survivor can hold an institution to account now depends heavily on which state they were abused in.
Here's how it happened, and why it's now a state-by-state matter.
How we got here
For decades two legal obstacles stood between abuse survivors and the institutions that harboured their abusers.
The first was the “Ellis defence”: many churches are unincorporated associations, not legal persons, so there was often no entity to sue. Victoria closed that door with the Legal Identity of Defendants (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2018, which forced such bodies to nominate a defendant. That Act gave survivors someone to sue but it left untouched the separate question of when an institution is actually liable.
The second obstacle is the doctrine of vicarious liability, the rule that makes an employer answerable for wrongs an employee commits in the course of employment. The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse recommended in 2015 that governments legislate so institutions could be held liable for abuse by people associated with them, unless they proved they took reasonable steps to prevent it. Most states enacted a version of that duty for future cases. The question of whether an institution could instead be made vicariously liable for someone who was not its employee — a priest, say — was left to the courts.
In November 2024 the High Court answered it.
What the High Court decided
The case was Bird v DP (a pseudonym). DP had been sexually abused as a child by Father Bryan Coffey, an assistant priest in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Ballarat. Because the Diocese is an unincorporated association, DP sued through the Bishop of Ballarat, Paul Bird. The question was whether the Diocese was vicariously liable for Coffey’s abuse, given that a priest is not, in law, an employee of his diocese.
The High Court unanimously allowed the Diocese’s appeal. A majority held that vicarious liability in Australia is confined to relationships of employment, and refused to extend it to relationships “akin to employment”, the test English courts had adopted. Because Coffey was not an employee, the Diocese could not be vicariously liable, however completely it controlled his appointment and his work. The Court also declined to decide whether the Diocese owed a non-delegable duty of care, because that argument had not been run in the courts below.
The consequence was specific. A priest is the textbook case of someone an institution controls but does not employ, so the decision shut off vicarious liability for exactly the people — clergy, religious brothers, some volunteers — through whom much institutional abuse was committed. And the Court was clear about whose job any change was: reform of vicarious liability, it said, is “properly the province of the legislature”. That line, quoted from the judgment in the Queensland bill’s explanatory notes, is the invitation every bill since has taken up.
The states respond, unevenly
Several parliaments took up the invitation of the Court, and here the states diverged.
The Australian Capital Territory passed the Civil Law (Wrongs) (Organisational Child Abuse Liability) Amendment Act 2025, a Greens private member's bill introduced by ACT Greens leader Shane Rattenbury, which the Labor government supported and amended, extending organisational liability to abuse by people “akin to an employee”.
Victoria followed with the Justice Legislation Amendment (Vicarious Liability for Child Abuse) Act, which amended the Wrongs Act 1958 to much the same effect and, importantly, applies retrospectively — so survivors of historic abuse can bring claims that Bird would have defeated. Victoria’s opposition, despite reservations, did not oppose it. Western Australia has moved on its own version. New South Wales, which extended vicarious liability prospectively back in 2018, saw a private member's bill to close the retrospective gap defeated in its upper house in June 2025. That's the gap Queensland's bill was meant to fill.
Introduced by the Labor opposition in April 2026 and sponsored by shadow attorney-general Meaghan Scanlon, the Civil Liability (Holding Institutions Accountable for Child Abuse) Amendment Bill 2026 would have amended the Civil Liability Act 2003 to extend vicarious liability to abusers in a relationship “akin to being employed”, applied retrospectively, and let a court set aside some claims settled before Bird was decided. On 17 November the government defeated it. Attorney-General Deb Frecklington argued that extending liability to undefined "akin to employment" relationships would create uncertainty and prolong already protracted litigation. Scanlon called the vote “cruel”.
Where the genuine disagreement lies
The principle that an institution should answer for abuse by those it placed in positions of trust has broad support: the Royal Commission recommended it and every reforming state has accepted it in some form. What's actually disputed is narrower: not whether institutions should be liable, but how.
One is retrospectivity. Extending liability to past abuse is what matters most to survivors, since the abuse is usually decades old. But the Royal Commission itself recommended that a statutory institutional-liability duty not apply retrospectively, and institutions and insurers argue that reopening settled matters, and imposing liability under rules that didn’t exist at the time, is unfair and hard to price. Supporters reply, as the Queensland bill’s sponsors did, that the Commission’s caution no longer reflects what the community expects. Both positions are on the public record.
The other is drafting. How widely should “akin to employment” and “associated with” an organisation reach, and can they capture volunteers, contractors and office-holders without the indeterminacy the High Court warned about? The ACT government narrowed the bill during passage, dropping the broader "associated with an organisation" limb. Queensland's government pointed to the risk of legal uncertainty; its critics call that cover for inaction.
Connections
This is one of two routes by which institutional accountability for past abuse is now being fought. The other is corporate: the use of restructures, asset transfers and insolvency to put money out of reach of survivors, as alleged in the Christian Brothers / Edmund Rice litigation. Both test the same thing: whether accountability for historic abuse survives a legal or corporate manoeuvre.
What’s at stake
The result, for now, is a patchwork. A survivor abused by a non-employee of an institution, such as a priest, a scout leader, a lay brother, may have a claim in Victoria or the ACT and no equivalent claim in Queensland or New South Wales, for the same kind of abuse by the same kind of person. The High Court has said the fix is Parliament’s to make. Some parliaments have made it; Queensland's, this week, joined New South Wales in declining. Whether that holds is now a political question, not a legal one.
This briefing reflects the position as at date of publication and is general information, not legal advice. It rests on the primary sources linked above; where a provision’s meaning is genuinely contested, we say so.